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STATEMENT OF INTRODUCTION 
Defendants Rushton, through their counsel, state that 
since the case deals with quiet title to real property that a 
"brief chronology" of events will be helpful. To a large degree 
that chronology is compiled with little concern for accuracy. 
Appellant does not believe that this background material 
will be helpful to the Court because it is totally irrelevant to 
the issues of appeal. However, if it is going to be submitted, 
it should be accurate and reflect the record which it largely 
does not. 
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RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
CORRECTED STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant's Statement No. 1 is incorrect: 
1. "Lester and Maxine Romero were fee title owners prior 
to April 9, 1979. (R-19)" 
ANSWER: (R-19 is a deed to Reed Maxfield from Golden 
Circle and does not show any reference about Romero being fee 
title holder prior to April 9, 1979. 
R-17 refers to the same property and on the "face of the 
deed" and below the property descriptions the deed states: 
"the above-described real property was sold in an 
assignment of contract of February 1, 1969, to Beaver 
Investment who thereafter assigned those rights to 
Golden Circle Investment." 
Therefore: Defendant's statement was incorrect by ten 
years and should read: 
Lester and Maxine Romero were fee title holders prior 
to February 1, 1969. (R-17) 
Mr. Romero's deeds to Golden Circle on April 9, 1919, 
were Quit Claim Deeds issued to finish clearing the (chain of 
title) to those transfers made in 1967 and 1969 ten and twelve 
years earlier and in the normal course of a real estate sale. 
Lester and Maxine Romero sold by assignment of contract 
their interest in the two homes (real estate contracts) at 3 020 
West 2995 South home (R-5) and 616 Colorado Street home (R-127) 
to Beaver Investment (R-128). Then Beaver Investment sold to 
Golden Circle Investment in 1974. (R-128-129) 
The first home at 3020 West 2995 South was transferred in 
"1967". (R-125) two (2) years before Mr. Romero started to receive 
welfare in 1969. (R-109 and 110 Findings of Fact paragraph no. 2) 
Case No. 216937 (R-109) is the case that the State of Utah obtained 
their judgment against Mr. Romero. Referring to the home at 3 02 0 
West 2995 South that Court used the above testimony and date (1967) 
(R-125) to establish the date 1967 in its Finding of Fact No. 4: 
"that the Defendant had transferred real property, or 
at least interest in real property within five years 
prior to application for welfare, most transfers tak-
ing place between the years 1967 and 1970." (R-109-110) 
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Defendant's Statement No. 2 is incorrect; 
2. "Prior to April 9, 1979, Lester and Maxine Romero 
represented that they assigned and sold properties to Beaver 
Investment who subsequently assigned and sold its interest to 
Golden Circle Investment. Lester Romero controlled the entities 
known as Beaver Investment and Golden Circle Investment." 
ANSWER: This statement is not based on the record and 
no record citation is given. 
Maxine Romero made no representation of any kind either 
in Case No. 216937 or in this case. 
With respect to the second portion of Statement No. 2, 
"Lester Romero controlled the entities Beaver Investment and 
Golden Circle Investment" defendant cites no record and it is 
contrary to sworn testimony in Case No. 219637 (R-130-131). 
The sworn testimony accepted by Judge Conder in Case No. 
216937 in June 1979 and shown as evidence to this case (with no 
opposing testimony) is that Romero did not control either entity. 
Otherwise Mr. Schwendiman, the Prosecuter, could have obtained a 
judgment against the property at that trial. But the Court ruled 
just the opposite. Findings of Fact No. 4 "...most transfers 
taking place between the years 1967 and 1970". See (R-125) where 
Judge Conder got the date 1967 in the Finding and Mr. Schwendiman 
wrote the Findings of Facet and Conclusions of Law. 
Mr. Romero testified he never owned stock or interest of 
any kind or "received any money" from either entity (R-130-131). 
So there is no misunderstanding. For a short time in 1979 at the 
request of the officers of Golden Circle Investment he became its 
(nominee) president. (R-131) 
Defendant's Statement No. 3 is incorrect: 
3. "On April 9, 1919, Lester and Maxine Romero conveyed 
the properties by Quit-Claim Deed to Golden Circle Investment. 
(R-19)" 
ANSWER: 
A. This statement is incorrect. Lester and Maxine Romero 
conveyed their property contracts in 1967 and 1969 to Beaver Invest-
ment (R-128-129) and Beaver Investment conveyed to Golden Circle in 
1974 (R-128-129) Then on April 9, 1979 to clear the chain of title 
issued Quit Claim Deeds to Golden Circle Investment. The Romero 
Court case Civil No. 216937 used Romero's exhibits and testimony as 
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to dates the properties were transferred starting in 1967—two (2) 
years before Romero applied for welfare as above referenced. 
B. The record referenced in Defendant's Statement does not 
in any way support their claim. 
Defendant's Statement No. 5 is incorrect: 
5. "On June 29, 1979, the State of Utah Division of Social 
Services obtained a judgment based upon fraud against Lester 
Romero. (R-2 0)" 
ANSWER: This statement as written would imply that a 
fraudulent transfer had taken place. It did not and the cited 
reference (R-20) does not say so. 
The judgment was granted against Romero for fraudulent 
withholding of material information. (R-112) 
In defendant Rushton's reply to the motion for summary 
judgment (R-47,48,49), Defendant states in paragraph 3 "the 
particular judgment was based upon the fraudulent transfer of 
lands", (ibid) 
The Court did "not" rule any of the properties were 
fraudlently transferred. One home (R-125) of Maxfield's was by 
Court ruling transferred two (2) years before Romero filed for 
welfare in 1969. (R-109-110) 
There simply was no fraudulent transfer found by the 
Court in Case No. 219637. 
Defendant's statement No. 7 is incorrect: 
7. "The properties were sold by the Sheriff's sale on 
October 1, 1980. (R-20)" 
Again the cited record doesn't say what the defendant 
claims. 
The Sheriff only levied on property. "...standing on the 
records of Salt Lake County in the name of Lester Romero... dated 
August 29, 1980." (R-23 & 23-1/2 two pages). This property by 
recorded deeds (chain of title) was in the name of plaintiff in 
the County records. (R-17,18,19,20). 
In the Sheriff's return "judgment rendered" October 1st 
only claimed the Sheriff's Deputy sold "...all the right, title 
claim and interest of said Defendant,...as recorded in the office 
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of the County Recorder of said County." (R-10-11, 59-60). Romero 
was their defendant, not Mr. Maxfield. (R-10) 
The property they described was by a complete chain of 
title. The property was recorded by deeds to Reed Maxfield 
(R-17,18,19,20), not to Mr. Romero. The Court had ruled a year 
earlier Romero had transferred it without telling the welfare 
people. See Judgment and Order, paragraph no. 2 "...because of 
his fraudulent withholding of material information..." 
Defendants knew by the chain of recorded deeds and the 
statements on the face of all four deeds properly notarized and 
recorded that they were not bonafide purchasers and they were not 
buying any of Romero's property. 
The Execution put out by the Court ordered the sale of 
the "...real property of the said Defendant, Lester Romero..." It 
did not order the sale of Reed Maxfield's recorded property. They 
could only sell whatever interest Romero had (R-2 3). And no know-
ledgable person would bid unless they had a guarantee of the return 
of their money. (R-65) 
The attorney for the State, an experienced attorney in 
title reports, knew no bonafide buyer would appear to buy with 
all the recorded title in Maxfield1s name. (R-17,18,19,20) 
As a result, no bonafide buyers appeared to bid on Septem-
ber 30th. And Reed Maxfield had no notice of the sale and didn't 
appear (R-27-28) Mr. Schwendiman postponed the sale one day so 
Lyle's father, Mr. Rushton, could bid. The Sheriff's real estate 
Execution states "the sale was postponed for 24 hours per request 
of Attorney for the Defendants." (R-107) 
Defendant's Statement No. 8 is incorrect: 
8. "The defendants Owen and Carol Rushton purchased the 
property at the Sheriff's sale for the amount of the judgment 
against Lester Romero, together with the costs of sale. (R-35,41)" 
Defendants actually bid $913.58 more than judgment and 
costs. The amount was returned to defendants, contrary to law. 
(R-413) The sale was also conducted one day beyond the legal 
postponement date. (R-107) 
These and additional facts would make the sale void. 
(R-412-413) 
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Defendant's Statement No. 10 is incorrect: 
10. "Defendants Rushton filed a Motion to Dismiss upon 
the grounds that they were innocent third-party purchasers, that 
Maxfield had not joined the State of Utah as a necessary party 
defendant, and that the relationship between Maxfield and Romero 
must be established in order to determine if the purported deed of 
conveyance was valid. (R-8)" 
ANSWER: The Motion to Dismiss was based on the allega-
tion that Romero was the owner of the properties prior to sale. 
Rushtons made no claim to innocence. They were told by the State 
of Utah: "there might be trouble down the road." They had the 
title report the night before the sale (R-411). Defendant's 
daughter, Lyle Rushton, was secretary to the attorney handling the 
case (R-412-413) Innocence simply does not describe the defen-
dants; a better term would be "insiders". 
Defendant's Statement No. 14 is not correct: 
14. "On June 19, 1984, plaintiff filed another Motion for 
summary Judgment which was denied by Judge David Dee on September 
25, 1984. A trial date was set for January 10, 1985. (R-215)" 
ANSWER: Judge David Dee did grant plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R-167). This Summary Judgment was set aside at 
the insistence of the State, claiming it had not received notice 
(R-215). 
Defendant's Statement No. 19 is not correct: 
19. "The trial date schedule for January 20, 1985, was 
stayed by filing of Notice of Bankruptcy. (R-258)" 
ANSWER: 
FIRST: The State of Utah through Mr. Tanner filed with 
this Court Mr. Maxfield's Chapter 11 Bankruptcy papers "and 
requested the trial date be stricken without date, pending the 
outcome of the Chapter 11 proceeding." (R-259) 
Mr. Tanner had represented to Judge Dee at the September 
25, 1984 hearing (we have the transcript) that one of the reasons 
the Summary Judgment Mr. Pace had gotten (R-167) should be 
cancelled was they wanted to dig into some of Mr. Maxfield's 
affairs. Mr. Tanner was asking for the trial to be stricken 
without date was for the purpose of looking at Mr. Maxfield's 
assets. This request caused a 2-year delay in this case. 
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This delay was at the request of defendants. 
Defendant's Statement No. 20 is inaccurate: 
20. "As part of the Bankruptcy proceedings, the plaintiff 
caused the claim against the defendants to be assigned to the 
Utah's Great Game Preserves, a Utah Corporation, controlled by the 
plaintiff and his family. Thereafter, the Stay was lifted enabling 
the case to be heard in the Third Judicial District Court." 
ANSWER: Paragraph No. 20 is in gross error. Also the last 
sentence in 20 is totally false. Judge Allen in the Federal 
Bankruptcy Court DID NOT LIFT THE STAY. Judge Allen denied the 
defendant's motion to lift the stay. (R-280). Judge Allen stated 
that based on all defendant's counsel's representations, defendants 
had no claim against Maxfield and Maxfield was the plaintiff in the 
case to be tried in State Court. (See motion to dismiss all claims 
by any party against plaintiffs.) (R-359-360) 
Defendant further claims that the time which has run since 
the sale has been harmful to the defendants. 
In response thereto: 
Counsel for the State of Utah and counsel for defendants 
Rushton both testified by affidavit at plaintiff's bankruptcy 
hearing that the properties were worth $50,000 each. 
The properties are rental properties and should produce a 
handsome cash flow for the defendants unless the properties are 
being poorly managed. 
The defendants have repeatedly blocked the attempted 
redemption in September 1984 and again after the final judgment. 
Defendants repeat in various places in their Brief that the 
defendants (Rushtons) are innocent third-party purchasers and that 
they have no relationship with Maxfield or Romero. They are the 
parents of their daughter Lyle, who was the secretary in the office 
of Counsel for the State of Utah and were given special privileges 
relating to the sale. Also if the sale is confirmed, defendants 
would obtain a windfall of over $83,000. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S ALLEGATION THAT THE COURT DID NOT 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ENTERING AN ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO PRESECUTE: 
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A great deal of time and energy could be wasted in trying 
to determine upon whose shoulders rests the fault for timing of the 
case. Plaintiff only wishes to make the point that the fault is 
not all his. 
For instance: 
(a) In 1981 Henry Nygaard, counsel for Rushtons, impor-
tuned defendant to wait for further proceedings until Rushtons 
returned from their mission (2 years). 
(b) The matter was ready for trial when the Attorney 
General asked and gave notice of taking Maxfield's deposition. 
These series of depositions commenced October 2, 1984, and lasted 
through December of 1984. 
In August of 1984, defendants moved to be allowed to amend 
their answer and counterclaim. 
On September 25, 1984, a trial date was set for January 10 
and 11, 1985. 
On January 3, 1985, plaintiffs filed a Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy. Nothing in the record indicates that this filing was to 
delay this proceeding (R-258, 260). 
Counsel for the State of Utah then moved for a continuance 
of trial without date (R-259). This delay was not at plaintiff's 
request. 
The motion further requested "pending the outcome in the 
Federal Court". 
When United States Bankruptcy Judge John Allen entered an 
order that the proceedings were not stayed, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
362, a certificate of readiness was filed dated November 18, 1986. 
Based upon this notice, the matter was proceeding to trial. 
It was at the pretrial hearing that the case was dimissed 
for failure to prosecute. This was prejudicial. 
The rule to be applied is well stated in Washington appeals 
Yellam v. Woener, 464 P.2d 947, 77 Wash. 2d 604, which stated: 
Rule for providing dismissal for want of prosecution 
is punitive in nature and every reasonable opportunity 
should be afofrded to permit the parties to reach the 
merits of the controversy. 
Also Utah Oil Co. vs. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (1977) where 
all of litigants have power to obtain relief and fail to do so. 
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It is error to dismiss with prejudice for failure to diligently 
prosecute. Also Westinahouse Electric Supply vs. Larson Contractor 
Inc., 544 P.2d 876: 
...Such prerogative falls shorts of unreasonable 
and arbitrary action which will result in injustice. 
The order dismissing the plaintiff's action was entered 
sua sponte by the Court at the final pretrial hearing. There was 
no evidence of failure to do anything ordered or expected by the 
Court. Under the circumstances, the Order of Dismissal is 
conspicuous, arbitrary, and prejudicial. 
On page 17 of defendant's brief, defendants make the 
unbelievable statement that (1) plaintiff will suffer no loss 
because the cause was assigned to a corporation; and (2) It was the 
plaintiff who abused the system and so plaintiff should not be 
allowed to compensation. 
The abuse of the system occured when the State of Utah sold 
plaintiff's property to satisfy a third party's debt and allowed a 
secretary (or her family) to purchase the property. It was the 
State who having wrongfully sold Maxfield's property now objects to 
his redeeming the same pursuant to statute and at the same time 
claim that the defendants are damaged because Maxfield has not 
redeemed. 
Rushtons was not bonafide good faith purchasers and they 
cannot be damaged both by keeping the property and by having to 
give it up as they claim. 
Defendants outline the costs of carrying the properties but 
fail to state income from rental and the total value ($50,000 each) 
over the purchase price. 
II. 
RESPONSE TO POINT II THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Without repeating the arguments plaintiff made in his Biref 
on Appeal, plaintiff's intermediate appeal was not denied on its 
merits. It was denied for the reason that the appeal was not from 
a final judgment. 
The only trouble with the arguments made by counsel for 
defendants in his Brief is that none of them are supported by 
fact. The facts submitted by plaintiff in his support of motion 
for summary judgment were unopposed. 
Plaintiff was entitled to a favorable ruling on the motion 
for summary judgment. 
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III. 
RESPONSE TO POINT III IN WHICH DEFENDANTS CLAIM THE COURT 
DID NOT ERR IN DENYING MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE ORDER OF REDEMPTION. 
It is difficult to understand why defendants resist right 
to redeem. Defendants state on page 24 of their Brief "the whole 
purpose of the litigation is to determine whether right of 
redemption rested with...Maxfield. Defendants have no standing to 
object to the redemption; however, every time plaintiff has sought 
to redeem, defendants have objected because of a spurious claim 
that Maxfield did not have title. It is curious that defendant 
(State of Utah) and defendants (Rushton) had no problem in selling 
the property out of Maxfield1s name. They, the defendants, seem to 
feel it is all right to sell Maxfieldfs property, but not all right 
for Maxfield to redeem. 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments and conclusions drawn in defendant's Brief 
are based on facts imperfectly perceived and clearly erroneous. 
The plaintiff had acquired his title to the subject prop-
erties a full two years before Romero had ever received benefits 
from the State of Utah. No Findings or Conclusions even imply 
fraudulent transfer. We simply have a case where the State (with-
out even color of reason) executed on the property of Maxfield 
(plaintiff) to pay a judgment against Romero. 
It is equally puzzling why the defendants should resist the 
desire of Maxfield to redeem. Defendants simply have no standing 
to object and redemption would make defendants whole (although it 
would still leave plaintiff Maxfield damaged by the amount of the 
redemption). 
As to the dismissal for failure to prosecute, the dismissal 
arose out of an argument between prior counsel for Maxfield (Brown) 
and the Honorable Court. The dismissal was imposed at pretrial 
just days before trial. The record also shows that both parties 
had consented to or engaged in acts which kept the case from going 
to an early trial. The circumstances of the dismissal compel the 
conclusion that the decision should be reversed on this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this/Z_ day of May, 1988 
)RIN N. PACE 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
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